

Introduction

- Identify denial of service attacks, port scans, and other cyber-attacks using network graphs.
- Unique approach that identifies anomalous hotspots by tracking sudden increases/decreases edges connecting to a vertex; or the sudden (dis)appearance of edges with high weight
- SNAPSKETCH** is fully unsupervised, has constant memory space usage, and can be used for real-time anomaly detection.

Research Objective

Problem Statement:

Given a graph stream $G_s = \{G_1, G_2, \dots, G_t, \dots\}$, our goal is to learn a graph representation function f for each graph $G_t \in \mathbb{R}^{|V|^2}$ such that $f : G_t \rightarrow v_{G_t} \in \mathbb{Z}^d$ and $d \ll |V|^2$ and using v_{G_t} detect whether a graph G_t at any time t contain an anomalous hotspot.

Goals

- Generate a fixed-size feature vector (**SNAPSKETCH**) to represent a graph in a graph stream.
- Detect DoS attack (a type of anomalous hotspot) in network traffic using a **SNAPSKETCH**.

Experimentation

- Run RRCF [1] anomaly detection algorithm on sketch vector generated by **SNAPSKETCH** generated, Spotlight [3], and StreamSpot [2] on the following two datasets and compare their performances.

Dataset	# of Graph	# of Anomalies	Edges
Smart Homes IoT	9,678	1,007	29,959,737
DARPA 1998	3,497	361	3,904,797

SNAPSKETCH Framework

- Perform node2vec [5] random walk on the graph and construct n-shingles.
- Identify discriminative shingles (shingles with the highest frequency) and randomly project them into a d-dimensional projection h_d .
- Sketch graphs using a simplified hashing of projection vector h_d and the cost of shingles c_t .
- The sketching converts the graph G_t into a d-dimensional sketch vector v_{G_t} .
- Detect anomalous hotspot using RRCF [2] in the sketch vector.
- SNAPSKETCH** has several advantages, fully unsupervised learning, constant memory space usage, entire-graph embedding, and real-time anomaly detection.




Fig 1. An Illustration of SNAPSKETCH framework

Real-time Anomaly Score




Fig 2. Anomaly score reported on smart home IoT traffic. Blue plot indicates the ground truth anomalies. Spike in red plots indicates the anomaly score reported by the respective approaches over time.

Fig 3: Anomaly score reported on DARPA dataset.

SNAPSKETCH Algorithm

Algorithm 1: SNAPSKETCH Algorithm

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Input: Graph Stream  $G_s = \{G_1, G_2, \dots, G_t, \dots\}$ 
Parameters: Sketch Dimension  $d$ , Number of Discriminative Shingle  $k$ , Walk Length  $l$ , Size of Shingle  $n$ 
Output: Graph Sketch  $v_{G_t}$ 
1 Function Main( $G_s, d, p, k, l, n$ ):
2   while not end of stream do
3      $p_{G_t} \leftarrow \text{node2vecWalk}(G_t, l)$ 
4      $S_t \leftarrow [p_{G_t}[i : i + n] \text{ for } i \text{ in range } (\text{len}(p_{G_t}) - (n - 1))]$ 
5      $S_t^k \leftarrow S_t.\text{sort}(\text{reverse}=\text{True})[:k]$  //get  $k$ -discriminative shingles
6      $h_d \leftarrow \text{Hashing}(S_t^k, d, r = 0.2)$ 
7      $u_{G_t} \leftarrow \text{Sketching}(S_t^k, h_d)$ 
8      $\text{Anom\_score} \leftarrow \text{RRCF}(u_{G_t})$ 
9      $d$ 
10  end
11 return  $v_{G_t}$ 
12 Function Hashing( $S_k, d, r$ ):
13   for  $S_i = S_k[1, \dots, k]$  do
14      $h_d \cup \text{random}([0, 1], d, p=[1-r, r])$ 
15   end
16 return  $h_d$ 
17 Function Sketching( $S_k, h_d$ ):
18   for  $S_i = S_k[1, \dots, k]$  do
19      $c_t \cup w_{S_i} \times r_{S_i}$ 
20   end
21    $v_{G_t} = c_t \times h_d$ 
22 return  $v_{G_t}$ 

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Results

Algorithm	Precision (top-m)			Recall (top-m)		
	100	200	300	100	200	300
Smart Home IOT Dataset						
Ground Truth	1.0	1.0	1.0	.099	.198	.298
SNAPSKETCH	.94	.86	.80	.093	.170	.239
SpotLight	.77	.73	.63	.076	.145	.190
StreamSpot	.69	.57	.54	.068	.114	.161
DARPA Dataset						
Ground Truth	1.0	1.0	1.0	.277	.554	.831
SNAPSKETCH	.83	.52	.34	.229	.288	.288
SpotLight	.80	.51	.34	.221	.282	.282
StreamSpot	.49	.29	.20	.135	.160	.163

Conclusion

- SNAPSKETCH** can effectively represent the graph into a fixed-size sketch vector.
- Using RRCF [1] on sketch vector anomalous events like denial-of-service attacks can be detected.
- SNAPSKETCH** has better precision and recall than baseline SpotLight [3] and StreamSpot [2] approaches on top-m anomalous graphs.

Acknowledgements

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