Dynamic Address Validation Array (DAVA): A Moving Target Defense Protocol for CAN bus

Abstract

This paper presents Dynamic Address Validation Array (DAVA), a novel moving target defense protocol for the Controller Area Network Bus (CAN bus). DAVA's primary goal is to mitigate the common CAN bus vulnerability of an unauthorized entity misappropriating components in the vehicle through sniffing and reusing ECU IDs for replaying messages. Using a dynamically allocated array stored in the ECU that is updated and validated frequently, DAVA limits an attacker's ability to reuse ECU IDs for replay attacks. The protocol strives to be minimally invasive and lightweight for application in CAN bus while still being secure. This paper discusses the DAVA protocol, a proof of concept implementation, and initial performance measurements. This paper explains how DAVA is able to provide a robust security framework for CAN bus without the need for a large amount of storage or CAN bus standard modification.